Local Telephone Service
BACKGROUND
[APRIL 1, 1998] The Michigan telephone industry dates back to 1877, when
an Ontonagon businessman installed a line between the Lake Superior port and his inland
office. When other business owners requested a similar arrangement, the Ontonagon
Telephone Company was created. Other local telephone companies were established around the
state during the same year. In 1913 Michigan legislators gave the Michigan Public Service
Commission (MPSC) power to regulate the industry.
Technological, economic, and
political change resulted in lawsuits between American Telephone and Telegraph
(AT&T)the dominant, regulated telecommunications carrier in the United
Statesand the U.S. Department of Justice in 1949 and 1974. Settlement of the latter
lawsuit, which was entangled in legal maneuvering until the early 1980s, created the
modified final judgment in 1982. The agreement effectively ended AT&Ts monopoly
in providing telephone services by separating its local and long-distance telephone
service companies. Exhibit 1 depicts graphically how the industry
looked before and immediately after the breakup and how it is evolving under deregulation.
19841996
The modified final judgement created the complex structure of the modern telephone
industry by dividing the market into two pieces.
The
long-distance telephone market would be opened to competition.
The
local-telephone market would remain a publicly regulated monopoly.
The modified final judgement split
AT&Ts local-exchange companies into seven regional Bell operating companies
(RBOCs); it is these RBOCs (the so-called baby Bells), plus other local exchange carriers
(LECs), that retained publicly regulated control over local telephone service.
The modified final judgement also
created local access and transport areas (LATAs) within each state. The LATAs helped to
draw a line between the LECs, which provided regulated local telephone service, and
interexchange carriers (IXCs), which provided competitive long-distance telephone service.
LECs
were restricted to providing telephone service only within a LATA
(intraLATA ).
Interexchange
carriers, such as AT&T and Sprint, competed for all calls between
LATAs (interLATA ).
In 1991 Michigan overhauled its
telecommunications law to reflect economic, political, and technological change. The
Michigan Telecommunications Act of 1991 allowed more than one company to offer local
telephone service in the same area, deregulated certain telephone services, and modified
the MPSCs role. The act included a December 1, 1995, sunset (expiration) provision,
and revised legislationthe Michigan Telecommunications Act of 1996took effect
soon after. The 1996 act gives the MPSC increased responsibility to approve and oversee
interconnection agreements (compacts between competitors that set out the fees and
conditions whereby they may use each others equipment or resell each others
services).
1996 and Forward
As the Michigan Telecommunications Act was being rewritten, telecommunications providers
were lobbying Congress to engage in a comprehensive rewrite of federal Communications Act
of 1934. In February 1996, just months after the new Michigan law was enacted, Congress
passed its Telecommunications Act of 1996. Among the federal acts major components
are
allowing
RBOCs (baby Bells) to provide interLATA telephone service (1) outside
of their home region at any time and (2) inside their home region
upon meeting a 14-point competitive checklist;
expanding
the Universal Service Fund to provide discounts on telecommunications
services to schools, libraries, and certain health care facilities;
deregulating
many cable television services by March 31, 1999, and allowing telephone
companies to offer cable television service;
increasing
the number of radio and television affiliates that networks may own,
removing all national limits on radio station ownership, and relaxing
local limits on concentration of ownership; and
making
it a crime under the Communications Decency Act to use the Internet
to (1) knowingly transmit obscene or indecent material to recipients
younger than 18 and/or (2) knowingly send or display any message that
depicts or describes patently offensive sexual activities or organs
(this provision subsequently was declared unconstitutional by the
U.S. Supreme Court).
Together, the new state and federal
telecommunications acts have begun to restructure the Michigan telecommunications
industry. In some instances, the federal act requires the MPSC and/or LECs to follow
certain rules that go further than requirements under the Michigan act.
In January 1997, Ameritech became
the first RBOC to file a request to offer in-region long-distance service. To be certified
as an IXC in Michigan, the MPSC and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC, the
federal regulating agency), had to approve the request based on a schedule and criteria
set out in the federal act. After withdrawing its first application, Ameritech re-filed
its application twice more and was rejected both times. In its latest opinion, the FCC
notes that Ameritech still had not provided competitors with nondiscriminatory
interconnection agreements or access to Ameritechs billing, 911, and installation
services (these are items on the 14-point competitive checklist mentioned above).
More than 94 percent of all Michigan
households have a telephone, and the state is home to 39 licensed LECs and 34 licensed competitive
LECs (CLECs) (but not all provide telephone service). While other companiesincluding
cable television systems and wireless telephone providersmay begin offering local
telephone service, the current players in Michigans local telephone market
are
Ameritech,
a RBOC and the states largest incumbent LEC (ILEC),
which dominates the Michigan market and operates 5.3 million telephone
lines in the state;
GTE
North, the states second largest ILEC, operating 700,000 lines;
independent
local telephone companies, operating 225,008 lines in total; and
several
CLECs, operating 200,000 lines in total.
As of December 1996, there are 88
companies in Michigans long-distance telephone market. AT&T dominates
with two-thirds of the market share (when measured by the number of lines), followed by
MCI (with about 15 percent) and others.
Exhibit 2
displays the share of the Michigan local and long-distance markets held by the various
companies (latest comparable data available).
DISCUSSION
By deregulating the telephone market and allowing
competition, regulators and policymakers hoped to allow market forces to decrease prices,
increase the number of new providers, and speed the deployment of new telecommunications
services. But opening the local telephone market to competition will be a difficult
process. Some challenges currently facing incumbents, competitors, and
regulatorssuch as defining what constitutes sufficient competition and setting out
new roles for regulatorsare much the same as those faced by the long-distance
telephone market after AT&T was broken up in the 1980s.
Appropriate Amount of
Competition
The debate about how much competition is necessary before the MPSC, FCC, and U.S.
Department of Justice certify an RBOC as a long-distance carrier is central to
implementing the federal Telecommunications Act. AT&T, for example, was considered to
have dominant market power until its market share dropped below 65 percent; only then was
the long-distance market considered competitive and AT&T freed from most government
regulatory oversight. In deciding at what point the local telephone market becomes
competitive, regulators must balance the quantity and quality of existing and future
competition against the market power of dominant, incumbent providers.
In its applications to be permitted
to offer long-distance service to Michigan consumers, Ameritech argued that it was indeed
in a competitive market because it had completed interconnection agreements with four
other companies. Ameritech also pointed out that the federal Telecommunications Act
requires Ameritech to resell the complete package of Ameritech servicesincluding
installation, repair, billing, directory listings, and value-added services such as voice
mail, three-way calling, or caller IDto any competitor at a 22 percent discount and
to individually sell the seven largest components of this complete service at a 50 percent
discount. Since the federal Telecommunications Act requires only that competition be
available and possible, Ameritech argued that its interconnection agreements, resale of
its complete service, and sale of individual service components each allow for full
competitionall that remained was for a competitor to choose to enter the market.
Opponents of Ameritechs
application to become a long-distance carrier argue that interconnection agreements do not
necessarily constitute the effective competition they believe the federal
Telecommunications Act requires. Opponents point out that Ameritechs competitors for
local-exchange service have 200,000 lines compared to Ameritechs 5.3 million. And
while Ameritechs total line count represents 82 percent of all telephone lines in
the state, opponents note that Ameritech still controls about 96 percent of all telephone
lines in its own service areas (that is, where it is the ILEC).
Getting Competing Companies
to Work Together
Interconnection agreements between carriers often are only the start of the process.
Implementing themwhich often requires that all parties involved give to each other
services of the same type and quality they give their own customersis a source of
friction between incumbent providers and competitors.
For example, in July 1997 Ameritech
decided that calls from Ameritech customers to Internet service providers (ISPs) who use
CLECs for their local telephone service were not local telephone calls. Because the
typical local telephone call to connect to the Internet lasts much longer than a typical
local telephone call to another person, Ameritech argues that Internet calls were tying up
its local telephone network. Furthermore, Ameritech argues that local Internet telephone
calls really are not local calls at allthey often are quickly transferred to a
computer system outside the local calling area. Therefore, Ameritech argues, these calls
are not eligible for reciprocal compensation (that is, the amount Ameritech pays to the
CLEC for completing the Ameritech customers call). In February 1998, the MPSC found
against Ameritech and ordered the company to pay the affected CLECs $6 million in fees
that it had withheld since July 1997, plus interest and attorney fees. Ameritech has
appealed the MPSCs ruling to federal district court.
The CLECs say that in addition to
the ILECs trying to manipulate the formal terms of interconnection agreements, they often
push the informal terms to the limit as well. They say ILECs sometimes delay installation
orders for competitors customers, delay upgrading the network telephone equipment
used by the CLECs, and charge CLEC customers for services that the ILECs own
customers receive for free. Some CLECs also argue that the endless ILEC legal challenges
to laws and regulation needlessly delay the competitive environment for both
companies customers.
Regulators, Courts, and
Government
Nationwide, regulators and courts alike have begun
interpreting specific provisions of both the state and federal telecommunications acts. In
late 1997 a federal judge in Texas struck down a key part of the federal actthe
prohibition on RBOCs entering the long-distance market until their local markets were
opened to competition; the decision is being appealed, and the outcome will have a major
effect. In addition to challenging the FCCs rules, ILECs and CLECs are taking their
state public-service regulatory bodies decisions and interpretations to court. Until
all the actors have exhausted their initial regulatory and legal avenues to challenge and
interpret both the state and federal telecommunications acts, and until the U.S. Supreme
Court rules on what is likely to be several cases regarding the federal act, local-service
telephone reform may seem to the consumer to be more court battle than market reform.
Units of government also must learn
how to react to the new telephone market, especially as courts uphold, strike down, and
interpret the law and regulations affecting it. Regulators are beginning to evaluate
interconnection agreements that are in force, but they often find they do not have the
human and financial resources to enable them to effectively investigate abuses or monitor
implementation; moreover, the number of interconnection agreements being filed is growing.
Parties to disputes resolved by public-utility regulatory bodies also complain about the
speed at which the bodies move. Six months elapsed, for example, between when, as
mentioned above, Ameritech stopped reimbursing CLECs for ISP calls and when the MPSC ruled
against Ameritech. During the delay, Ameritech withheld $6 million in CLEC service fees.
Now that Ameritech has appealed the MPSCs ruling in U.S. District Court, the
resolution will be delayed further. One party to the dispute characterizes the resolution
process to date as "slow, tedious, and expensive" for everyone involved.
Governments and other entities that
control rights of way (e.g., telephone poles, sewers and underground cable facilities,
roads and trails, and electric power-line poles) also are affected by the restructuring of
the telecommunications industry. An example of a conflict is when CLECs that want to build
their own local telephone infrastructure are asked to pay right-of-way use charges, but
the ILECs either had not been required to pay them or were charged substantially less than
the amount being asked of the CLECs. Other conflicts arise between municipalities and any
telephone provider over the definition of the municipalitys out-of-pocket expenses
that may be charged back to the provider.
There are opportunities for
cooperation as well. For example, the City of Lansing and the Lansing School District have
been approached by a consortium of telecommunications service providers for permission to
place new towers on certain school and city park properties. If the deal (still under
review) goes through, the city and school district will receive annual lease payments for
the leases duration. Both sides agree that treating the towers as a package has
benefits for all: The city can create a master zoning plan for all towers at once, while
the consortium gets a decision on a package of towers rather than having to go though a
separate approval process for each.
Consumers and Local
Telephone Rates
Telephone competition is bringing confusion and turmoil to consumers; popular culture is
rife with derisive jokes about the number of telephone calls received during the dinner
hour asking consumers to switch their long-distance service. But according to the Consumer
Federation of America, competition in the local market still is a long way off. Since the
federal Telecommunications Act passed in February 1996, 50 million Americans have changed
switched their long-distance carrier, but only one million have switched local service
providers. In Michigan, according to a February 1998 MPSC report, just under 4 percent of
Ameritechs telephone lines were operated by CLECs in the Ameritech service
territory; no CLECs operated at all in GTEs service territory.
In late 1997 Ameritech filed an
application with the MPSC to raise local-service rates for some business and residential
services by about 1.8 percent. Ameritech contends that this is only the second rate
increase for Michigan customers since 1984, even though the Michigan Telecommunications
Act permits it to raise rates annually by a percentage equal to inflation (the rise in the
consumer price index) minus one percent. Given the complex structure of the
telecommunications industry and market, determining whether rates have increased or
decreased over time is a substantial challenge. Exhibit 3 presents
Ameritechs local-service rates since 1985 in five Michigan cities.
Some observers applaud Ameritech for
holding rates fairly steady over a 14-year period when inflation equaled a cumulative 46
percent; had rates gone up each year by the inflation rate, the Detroiters would be paying
$17.37 instead of $13.48 now. Others look at the same numbers and claim that they are
evidence that Ameritechmuch like other LECsis not passing savings along to
consumers; they note that technological change has decreased the real cost
of some telephone services and, therefore, rates should have come down over
the same period, even when adjusted for inflation.
Regardless of which interpretation
of historical rates is correct (some say neither is, completely) supporters of competition
point to the price decreases in competitive markets as a key benefit of deregulation.
Michigan and Illinois, for example, both allow intraLATA competition, but in Michigan such
competition is virtually nonexistent and in Illinois it is very strong. In 1997 the
Michigan Competitive Telecommunications Provider Association (MCTPA) and the Michigan
Consumer Federation both noted that Ameritech charges its Michigan customers $0.17 a
minute for intraLATA calls, but its Illinois customers are charged only $0.10 for the
first minute and $0.04 a minute thereafter.
But as is the case with local
telephone rates above, determining whether rates are higher or lower is a more complicated
task. While Ameritech grants that its per-minute intraLATA charges are higher in Michigan,
it also points out that the average intraLATA call in Michigan costs only
$0.58 while the average intraLATA call in Illinois costs $0.82. Furthermore, Ameritech
argues that comparing intraLATA call costs between states is extremely difficult. Although
Michigan and Illinois are roughly the same size (just over 55,000 square land miles),
Michigan is divided into 5 large LATAs, while Illinois is divided into 14 smaller LATAs.
Many of Michigans intraLATA calls, therefore, would be long distance calls if they
occurred in other states.
Conclusion
The local telephone market in Michigan is in the beginning of a long transition to full
competition. But incumbents and competitors alike seem to agree that at the end of the
process, the competitive market itself will best police interconnection agreements,
services, and rates. Consumers will be able to choose among multiple providers; regulators
and government will ease into a new role as "referees" in the new competitive
environment; and telephone companies will define their service areas and tailor their
offerings and prices to the marketplaces needs and demands.
But in creating a competitive
local-telephone market, regulators, telephone companies, and the courts should not
underestimate the power of technological change. Elsewhere in the world, cellular
telephones are replacing traditional wire-based telephone service for local markets
(companies find it cheaper to install a single cellular tower that will serve an entire
community than to install a wire to each home and business). In the United States, in
contrast, cellular telephones generally are seen as a supplement to existing wire-based
local service. As cable television and cellular telephone companies begin offering
competitive local-telephone service, it will increase the competitive pressure on ILECs
and CLECs to lower rates and provide additional services.
See also
Consumer Protection; Internet
and Computers.
FOR
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Antitrust Division
U.S. Department of Justice
555 4th Street, Room 8104
Washington, D.C. 20001
www.usdoj.gov/atr
Federal Communications Commission
1919 M Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20554
(202) 418-0200
(202) 418-0232 FAX
www.fcc.gov
Michigan Competitive
Telecommunications Providers Association
124 West Allegan Street
800 Michigan National Tower
Lansing, MI 49833
www.mctpa.com
Michigan Consumer Federation
115 West Allegan Street
Lansing, MI 48933
(517) 482-6262
Michigan Public Service
Commission
P.O. Box 30221
Lansing, MI 48909
(517) 334-6445
(517) 882-5002 FAX
www.michigan.gov/mpsc
Telecommunications Association of
Michigan
1400 Michigan National Tower
Lansing, MI 48933
(517) 482-4166
(517) 482-3548 FAX